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Abstract
We introduce a robust algorithm for face verification, i.e., deciding whether two
images are of the same person or not. Our approach is a novel take on the idea of
using deep generative networks for adversarial robustness. We use the generative
model during training as an online augmentation method instead of a test-time
purifier that removes adversarial noise. Our architecture uses a contrastive loss term
and a disentangled generative model to sample negative pairs. Instead of randomly
pairing two real images, we pair an image with its class-modified counterpart while
keeping its content (pose, head tilt, hair, etc.) intact. This enables us to efficiently
sample hard negative pairs for the contrastive loss. We experimentally show that,
when coupled with adversarial training, the proposed scheme converges with a
weak inner solver and has a higher clean and robust accuracy than state-of-the-art-
methods when evaluated against white-box physical attacks.
1 Introduction
Deep neural networks have become the de facto model of choice for complex computer vision tasks
such as large-scale image classification [Russakovsky et al., 2015], face recognition [Parkhi et al.,
2015, Liu et al., 2017], high quality image synthesis [Karras et al., 2019], and denoising [Zhang
et al., 2017]. In particular, face recognition, re-identification, and verification have seen marked
improvements when paired with deep learning [Masi et al., 2018]. At the same time, adversarial
examples [Goodfellow et al., 2014] have demonstrated to be a failure mode of deep neural networks
not only in the digital domain but in the physical world as well [Kurakin et al., 2016, Sharif et al.,
2016, Athalye et al., 2018].
Adversarial training [Goodfellow et al., 2014, Madry et al., 2018] is one of the more successful
empirical defense methods that has inspired numerous extensions [Zhang et al., 2019a, Xie et al.,
2019]. Our work is carried out in this direction and introduces an architecture for adversarially robust
face verification against physical attacks. Our proposed method trains an embedding model using
a similarity loss, a generative model to augment pairs of samples and a weak adversarial training
procedure — where the location (but not the pattern) of the perturbation is chosen randomly.
As a motivating example, consider the following scenario, where we train a robust model that
recognizes whether two images are of the same person or not. During training, we sample a negative
pair of images and add an adversarial eye patch to one of them. If the two samples contain persons
facing different directions, then pose also acts as a discriminator and prevents the model from
learning robust features. If we would have pairs of samples that are aligned in terms of content (pose,
background, smile, etc.), then the network would focus on learning features that are meaningful when
obscured by the patch. In our proposed model we use a generative model with disentangled latent
factors as a form of online data augmentation to generate such pairs during training by transferring
class information between samples.
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Our main contribution is, to the best of our knowledge, the first architecture that uses a generative
model for data augmentation to reach convergence when trained with a weak inner adversary. Our
approach randomly selects a perturbation mask at each step. We show that this leads to higher clean
and robust accuracies over state-of-the-art methods, while being more computationally efficient.
State-of-the-art approaches implement a non-augmented model trained using a near-optimal inner
adversary. Furthermore, we find that non-augmented adversarial training with random patch locations
– as approximators to physical attacks – does not converge to a robust solution and instead exhibits a
critical overfitting phenomenon [Rice et al., 2020].
2 Proposed Method
Let G(zcl, zco) be a deep generative model with a partitioned latent space, such that zcl is responsible
for modulating the class identity of the generated image x, whereas zco carries all information about
the content. Let Ecl(x) and Eco(x) be two deep neural networks (encoders) that extract the class and
content information from x, respectively. Together, the composed model G(Ecl(x), Eco(x)) can be
viewed as an autoencoder with a disentangled latent space. A formal notion of disentanglement is
still an open problem, but we use the recent definitions introduced in Shu et al. [2020]: we consider
a generator disentangled if modifying one of the two components does not change the other when
re-extracted from the new sample by an oracle function. While we do not have a closed-form
expression for the oracle functions, we think of them as equivalent to human-level perception.
Let x and t be two samples with potentially different ground truth class identities cx and ct. Our goal
is to learn a binary decision function D that takes as input the pair (x, t) and returns one if cx 6= ct
and zero otherwise. A zero output signifies D perceiving that x and t have the same class identity.
We use the feature embedding from a deep neural network F and rewrite the detector that uses x as
target and t as candidate image as
D(t;x) =
{
1, ‖F (t)− F (x)‖2 ≥ δ
0, otherwise
(1)
where δ is a detection threshold and x has class identity cx, assumed to be unaltered by any adversary.
In practice, for a face verification system, x can be a single image taken of the target person in a
physically secure environment. To efficiently train the embedding function F , we propose a two-pair
contrastive loss term [Hadsell et al., 2006], in the form of
L(x, y, t, u) = ‖F (x)− F (y)‖22 +max{m− ‖F (t)− F (u)‖22 , 0} (2)
where m is the margin between the positive and negative pairs. A block diagram is shown in Figure
1. x, y, t, u are four distinct samples such that x, y, u share the same class identity cx and t has a
different class identity ct 6= cx.
The four samples are obtained accordingly:
• x and t are sampled independently from the underlying distributions governing cx and ct,
respectively.
• y = G (Ecl(x), Eco(x)). That is, y is the pass-through reconstruction of x through the
autoencoder.
• u = G (Ecl(x), Eco(t)). That is, u is obtained by generating a sample with the same class
identity as x but with the content information of t.
In practice, we only have access to a finite number of labeled samples for each class identity, each
with different content information, e.g., different pictures of the same person in different poses. To
sample x and t, we first randomly sample a class cx, then uniformly sample in- and out-of-distribution
images. In the non-robust version, the weights θ of the network are shared and receive gradient
updates from both pairs simultaneously towards the objective function
min
θ
Ex,t [L(x, y, t, u; θ)] (3)
where θ are the weights of F optimized with stochastic gradient descent.
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Figure 1: Left: Architecture of the proposed approach. Blocks containing the same sub-models are
identical (weights are shared at all times). Right: Example of x, y, t, u quadruplets.
2.1 Why Autoencode x?
Notice that, if the autoencoder given by G(Ecl, Eco) has zero generalization error, then y = x and
F (y) = F (x). This would lead to a collapse of our loss function, since it would only learn to
maximize the loss between different samples, encouraging the learning of a chaotic mapping that
does not actually take the person’s identity into account. There are two key factors that help regularize
against this type of collapse, outlined as follows.
The autoencoder is not ideal. The reconstruction error is distributed asymmetrically between the
class and content information. While there are slight variations in the class identity, the background
is often reconstructed poorly, as shown for example in Bau et al. [2019]. We find that this also holds
true for the generative models that we use in our experiments. This helps the embedding model by
signaling that background information is not relevant for good discrimination.
Data augmentation. We perform patch augmentation [DeVries and Taylor, 2017, Lopes et al.,
2019], followed by patch adversarial training on the real images x but not on the synthetic images y
and u. This encourages the embedding F to learn robust features that signal facial similarity.
2.2 Why Generate u?
The main purpose of G in the proposed scheme is to efficiently generate negative pairs closer to
the decision boundary by transferring all content information between classes, allowing F to learn
discriminative features regarding the class identity. In particular, for face images, the learned features
should be independent of the person’s pose, expression, etc. This role is played even in the absence
of any augmentation in the negative pair and is further magnified by adversarial training.
Together, the generated images y and u serve as virtual anchors for learning the embedding F .
Furthermore, since they both have the same class identity, our proposed loss function is similar to a
triplet loss, except that the anchor is different in the two pairs, but preserves class information. It
could be possible to replace y with a real sample with different content information, however, this
causes the learning to quickly overfit, since u is the only sample produced by the generator and has
spurious artifacts that act as discriminators.
2.3 Robust Optimization
We adopt the framework of Madry et al. [2018] and define the robust optimization objective as
min
θ
Ex,t,Mx,Mt
[
max
δx,δt
L (x+Mx · δx, sg(y), t+Mt · δt, sg(u); θ)
]
(4)
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The variablesMx andMt represent binary masks that restrict the perturbation to a subset of input
pixels. Critical to our approach is the fact that we randomly sampleMx andMt, instead of including
them in the inner optimization objective. This allows us to reduce computational complexity but also
significantly weakens the online adversary. The function sg represents the stop gradient operator,
meaning that y and u are treated as constants for the inner optimization problem. Expanding the loss
function allows us to decompose the optimization over both inputs as
min
θ
Ex,t,Mx,Mt
[
max
δx
‖F (x+Mx · δx)− sg(F (y))‖22 −min
δt
‖F (t+Mt · δt)− sg(F (u))‖22
]
(5)
The first term can be viewed as a form of untargeted optimization: we optimize δx such that x loses
its original class identity (when viewed through F ). Meanwhile, the second term is a form of targeted
optimization: δt is optimized such that t is viewed as belonging to a particular class identity. Note
that we neglect m in the above for brevity. From this formulation we derive another form of robust
optimization that operates with real (non-augmented) image pairs and we call weak adversarial
training. Letting u = y and sampling y from the distribution of real images, we effectively remove
the generator and both encoders from the optimization, recovering the optimization problem
min
θ
Ex,y,t,Mx,Mt
[
max
δx
‖F (x+Mx · δx)− F (y)‖22 −min
δt
‖F (t+Mt · δt)− F (y)‖22
]
(6)
3 Physical Adversarial Attacks and Defenses
We use mask-based attacks as an approximation for physically realizable attacks, similar to Wu et al.
[2020]. That is, we assume that an adversary can modify a contiguous region of the image without
any restrictions on the norm of the perturbations. The two degrees of freedom an adversary has are
related to the relative size of the perturbed regionM and its location in the image.
We assume that the adversary has complete (white-box) knowledge of the detector D, including the
weights and architecture of F , as well as the image of the target person xt and their corresponding
features F (xt). We test our approach against impersonation attacks (an adversary starts from an
image x with class identity different than ct and attempts to bypass the detector D so as to label
them as ct) and evasion attacks (the adversary attempts to evade identification). Given a white-box
impersonating adversary and a fixed position for the allowed perturbations asM, the optimization
objective is straightforward to formalize as an unconstrained feature adversary [Sabour et al., 2015]
min
δ
‖F (x+M · δ)− F (xt)‖22 . (7)
We evaluate our performance against the following threat models:
1. Adversarial eyeglass frame attack with a fixed location for the maskM covering 2.6% of
the image.
2. Square patch attack [Wu et al., 2020] covering 2.5% of the image, in which the attacker
performs a search to find the best patch location.
3. Universal eye patch attack [Brown et al., 2017] covering 10% of the image, where a single
adversarial pattern with a fixed location covering the eyes is trained for multiple intruders.
The adversarial eyeglasses and square patch are single-image attacks for which an instantaneous
perturbation is found, thus are only an approximation for physical conditions. We do not consider the
expectation-over-transformation framework [Athalye et al., 2018], which imposes more restrictions
on the attacker. Doing this makes our attacks stronger, on average, but occupying a smaller area of
the image.
3.1 Adversarial Training against Occlusion Attacks
Wu et al. [2020] propose to extend the robust optimization framework of Madry et al. [2018] to
defend against occlusion attacks. This poses another important question: how to choose the patch
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Figure 2: Train/test loss during training for the three proposed methods, with the same hyper-
parameters. Weak adversarial training on real images shows overfitting, while our approach converges
to a robust solution.
locationM during training? This is an issue, since the ideal solution would be to perform the attack
for all patch locations and then pick the best result. However, even simply computing the initial loss
function at all possible patch locations is computationally prohibitive, since it requires a large amount
of forward passes each batch. To solve this issue, Wu et al. [2020] propose an approximate search
algorithm that integrates the magnitude of the gradient across different patch locations, picks the
top C candidates, and finally selects the location with the highest value of the loss function after
in-painting.
We ask the following question: is it possible to train a robust classifier by randomly selecting the
occlusion mask at each optimization step? As baselines, we consider weak patch adversarial training
directly on the triplet loss in (6) with random mask selection and the gradient-based selection in Wu
et al. [2020].
4 Experimental Results
We use the disentangled generative model introduced by Gabbay and Hoshen [2020], trained on the
CelebA dataset [Liu et al., 2015]. We define the class code as the person identity and the content code
as all other information included in the image and split the images in 9177 training persons and 1000
test persons. The cost of training G is approximately 14 hours for 200 epochs. For the embedding
network, we use the architecture in VGGFace [Parkhi et al., 2015] with the following modifications:
we normalize the weights of the final embedding layer to unit L2-norm and we remove the ReLU
activation to help regularize the model during training and enable a more expressive feature space.
For the two-pair contrastive loss, we set m = 10.
We train F using a subset of images corresponding from 2000 samples from the data used to train the
generative model and validate the performance on a set of 100 test persons. The test persons are never
seen byG,Ecl, Eco or F . We use the Adam optimizer Kingma and Ba [2014] with learning rate 0.001
and PGD-based adversarial training [Madry et al., 2018] with a constraint of  = 1. We perform a
hyper-parameter search for the best combination of step size and number of steps, and find that 10
steps with step size 16/255 produces the best results. For our approach, we measure validation loss
exclusively on real pairs of images. For the feature adversary, we run an Adam optimizer on (7) for
1000 iterations with learning rate 0.01 and 5 restarts. For the square patch attack we search for the
best location by running 20 iterations with a larger learning rate across all possible locations.
Training takes approximately 11 and 25 hours for our method (excluding the cost of training G) and
DOA, C = 10, respectively, on a single Nvidia RTX 2080Ti GPU.
4.1 Weak Adversarial Training
Our first result is shown in Figure 2 and indicates that the proposed approach convergences with
random patch locations, whereas training on real image pairs does not. This validates our approach
as an online data augmentation method that enables fast converge to a robust solution [Rice et al.,
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Figure 3: Feature distance between a pair of real-real and real-generated images with different
class identities. Left: Measured with a pretrained VGGFace [Parkhi et al., 2015] network. Right:
Measured with a robust network trained with DOA [Wu et al., 2020].
2020]. Furthermore, even when considering the Defense against Occlusion Attacks (DOA) approach
as a baseline, which performs an approximate search for the best patch location, our approach shows
comparable test performance while being less expensive.
The divergence of weak adversarial training is reminiscent of mode collapse in generative adversarial
networks, where the generator overpowers a discriminator that is weakly trained (either through the
number of steps or the architectural choice) and the loss function collapses, implying that randomly
selecting a patch location significantly weakens the inner adversary. To illustrate the role of G as
a helper to the inner adversary Figure 3 plots the pairwise distance between persons with different
class identities when the second image in the pair is either real or generated. To measure this distance
we use two networks, independent of our approach: a pretrained VGGFace network [Parkhi et al.,
2015] and a robust network trained with DOA [Wu et al., 2020], since prior work [Ilyas et al., 2019]
has shown that robust networks serve as good feature extractors.
Furthermore, even though the test losses are comparable, our approach achieves better test areas
under the receiver operating characteristic curve (AU-ROC) and precision-recall (AU-PR) curve,
thus is superior for face verification purposes. We use a weak form of semi-hard example mining to
further regularize the convergence of all methods. For each negative pair, we sample a number of two
persons with identity different than the target and pick the one that produces a lower feature distance
when matched against the target. In the case of our approach, we first reconstruct both candidate
intruders and measure similarity between t and u, instead of comparing them with the real image x.
4.2 Test Time Augmentations
We augment F at test time with face mirroring, which is routinely used to boost the performance
of face recognition systems [Schroff et al., 2015]. That is, we extract representations from both the
candidate image and its symmetrically flipped version and then compute the average feature distance
with respect to the ones extracted (or stored) of the target image. Additionally, when we have multiple
samples of the target available, we perform target sample selection: we choose as target the image
which minimizes the average feature space distance to all others. In practice, this means choosing a
clear, non-obscured image as the target, as opposed to outliers. We apply these augmentations to both
our baselines.
We test our approach on a set of samples corresponding to 27 randomly selected test persons from
the CelebA dataset, each with at least ten samples. The results are shown in Table 1, from which we
see that our approach is superior to both weak adversarial training (with early stopping at the best
validation AU-ROC) and DOA, even though training is done with random patch locations. As an a
posteriori justification for choosing eyes as the location for the universal patch attack, we inspect the
best location found in the square patch attack and note that the locations mostly focus around the eye
region, which agrees with how humans perform face recognition [Keil, 2009].
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Table 1: Performance of the proposed approach with different test time augmentations. We compare
against weak patch adversarial training and DOA [Wu et al., 2020] trained with a number of C =
{4, 10} mask candidates returned by the approximate search. Higher is better.
Clean Eyeglasses Square Patch Eye Patch
AU-ROC AU-ROC AU-PR AU-ROC AU-PR AU-ROC AU-PR
Ours, Basic 0.957 0.773 0.809 0.742 0.785 0.775 0.789
Ours, Mirroring 0.959 0.812 0.845 0.789 0.825 0.791 0.804
Ours, Selection 0.976 0.831 0.868 0.809 0.848 0.884 0.895
Ours, Both 0.978 0.868 0.896 0.850 0.882 0.893 0.903
Weak AT 0.886 0.704 0.726 0.700 0.722 0.571 0.556
DOA, C = 4 0.972 0.830 0.873 0.836 0.873 0.826 0.844
DOA, C = 10 0.967 0.843 0.878 0.831 0.864 0.879 0.886
Figure 4: Top: Target images from which target features are extracted. Bottom: Images found by
running unrestricted feature copy attack when starting from random noise images.
4.3 Evasion Attack
We run a feature adversary that starts from images t with the same class identity as x and maximize
the objective in (7) in order to evade verification. We set the detection threshold δ such that the false
positive rate is equal to 5% and obtain that the attack detection rates are 25.2% for our proposed
approach and 19.8% for DOA. While this marks evasion attacks as a weakness for both methods,
the proposed approach is still able to obtain an improvement. The drop in performance can be
intuitively explained by the fact that the adversary is no longer constrained by a targeted attack (i.e.,
impersonating a specific person).
4.4 Indirect Anchor Attack
Recall that our model is never exposed to pairs of real samples during training and that the two
generated samples y and u share the same person identity and act as virtual anchors. We introduce a
new type of attack in which the feature adversary intentionally attempts to copy the features of the
auto-encoded target y, instead of x. We find that this attack is almost as successful as attacking the
real target x and that our scheme maintains its robustness, with the AU-ROC dropping from 0.868 to
0.867 when we consider the most successful attack across both the regular and anchor attacks.
Even though F is fully differentiable — because of the virtual anchors y, u that are used for training —
there is a reasonable suspicion of gradient masking [Athalye et al., 2018] on the loss surface between
two real images. Since our indirect attack is almost as successful as attacking the real image of the
person, we conclude that the loss surface is non-degenerate and no gradient masking occurs.
Finally, we also perform a completely unrestricted feature copy attack (also referred to as distal
adversarial examples [Schott et al., 2019]) when starting from a pure noise image. Prior work [Ilyas
et al., 2019] has shown that robust networks will produce samples that resemble the image from which
the target features are obtained. Figure 4 plots the results, where we notice that some distinctive
features of the targets, such as eyes, mouth and forehead are present in the images. All images
successfully converge to a low value of the feature distance, a further sign that gradient masking does
not occur.
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5 Discussion
Patch adversarial training using an optimal adversary at every step leads to an increase of complexity
for the inner solver and raises an important practical issue: which spatial location should be cho-
sen? The proposed approach exhibits higher clean and adversarial accuracy than prior work that
approximately searches for the patch location. Furthermore, from the results we have obtained, it is at
least apparent that randomly picking the patch location is not sufficient to ensure convergence to an
accurate and robust solution by training on non-augmented data. This raises the important question
of if there is a fundamental trade-off between robustness and accuracy [Zhang et al., 2019b] when
defending against patch attacks, which we consider a promising direction for future work.
Recent work [Wong et al., 2020, Zhang et al., 2020, Cai et al., 2018] has investigated the adjustments
that can be made to weak (single-step optimization) adversarial training in order to converge to a
robust solution and has found that particular schedules of the learning rate and tuning the strength of
the attacker over time improve convergence. We believe that this is a very promising topic of future
research when it comes to defending against physically realizable attacks and our work contributes
in this direction by enabling fast adversarial training against patches and removing one layer of
complexity, i.e., searching for the optimal location. Finally, in this work we did not perform any
fine tuning of the learning rates for the weight optimizer in the style of Wong et al. [2020], but we
believe a larger-scale study to understand the convergence properties of patch adversarial training is
an interesting research topic.
6 Related Work
Adversarial Attacks and Defenses The closest related work to ours is Wu et al. [2020], which
introduces adversarial training [Madry et al., 2018] for patch-based attacks. However, their setting
is different: they apply their method to a ten-class face recognition (classification) problem, where
each person identity is seen during training. In contrast, we train our model at a larger scale and
test on a completely different subset of persons. Yin et al. [2020] propose an integrated training
procedure for robust classification and adversarial sample detection. Our approach is similar, in that
we apply adversarial training to a detection criteria, but we do it symmetrically. Specializing to patch
attacks, several certified robustness methods exist for classification [Chiang et al., 2020, Levine and
Feizi, 2020], but these methods still must pay a price in clean accuracy. In particular, Chiang et al.
[2020] discuss the issue of providing a certificate by picking a subset of random patch locations,
similar to what we do for training. Recent work [Wong et al., 2020, Rice et al., 2020, Zhang et al.,
2020] also investigates the dynamics of adversarial training and has shown that using a weak inner
solver without extra precautions, such as manually tuning the learning rate, leads to overfitting. Our
proposed approach converges without any additional tuning.
Face Recognition and Verification The tasks of face recognition and verification have seen signifi-
cant improvements in the recent years, starting with Schroff et al. [2015]. In particular, hyperspherical
embeddings have seen increased popularity recently [Liu et al., 2017, Deng et al., 2019], where
they have been found to be favorable for different types of margin-based losses. Zhang et al. [2016]
tackle the problem of joint representation learning and face alignment by using the same embedding
function. We decouple the two tasks and use the generative model G for virtual alignment. The
quadruplet loss [Chen et al., 2017] is an extension of the triplet loss [Hoffer and Ailon, 2015] that
also uses four terms for training a similarity metrics but in a conceptually different way, since they
form three pairs of samples. Regarding adversarial attacks on face recognition systems, there exists
a plethora of work that shows the vulnerability of deep learning-based models [Sharif et al., 2016,
Dong et al., 2019, Carlini and Farid, 2020].
Disentangled Latent Representations Shu et al. [2020] recently introduced a framework for for-
mal definitions of disentanglement, which we use to provide intuition for our approach. Learning
disentangled representations has been proposed, among others, with variational autoencoders [Math-
ieu et al., 2018] and generative networks [Tran et al., 2017, Gabbay and Hoshen, 2020], in both
unsupervised and supervised settings. We use the particular construction of Gabbay and Hoshen
[2020], but our approach works with any architecture that achieves disentanglement and can benefit
from future improvements in the field.
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